Publicising the lives of public people : nothing to hide, nothing to fear? by Khodaverdi, Maryam, 1983-
MARY AM KHODA VERDI 
PUBLICISING THE LIVES OF PUBLIC PEOPLE 
- NOTHING TO HIDE, NOTHING TO FEAR? 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
CENSORSHIP AND THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
(LAWS 520) 
FACULTY OF LAW 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
2008 
-~-
C'tl 
r:JJ 
0 
>-t) 
-0 
C: 
cr' --· (') 
-0 
C'tl 
0 
-0 
co" 
I 
z 
0 ...... 
::r -· ::s 
00 
...... 
0 
::r -· 0..
C'tl 
§ 
...... 
::r -· ::s 
00 
...... 
0 
~ e; 
•-.:) 
Victoria 
UNIVERSITY OF WELLING TON 
Te Whare Wa11anga 
O te Opoko o te Ika a Maui 
~ 
LIBRARY 
"The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others 
and whose every need, thought fancy or gratifications is subject to public scrutiny, 
has been deprived of his individuality and human dignity. 
Such an individual merges with the mass ... 
[S] uch a being, although sentient, is fungible; he is not an individual." 
- E. Blaustein -
ABSTRACT 
This essay examines how the right to privacy is protected in Germany and New 
Zealand and where the weak points of these legal systems are in regard to this right. 
Especially in context to the competing right to freedom of expression. 
In order to access the problems in context with these issues, landmark jurisdiction 
from Germany, Europe and New Zealand is examined. The outcome is analysed with a view 
to existing constitutional and federal legislation in the respective countries. 
What follows is a comparison of the regulation of the right to privacy in Germany, the 
European Union and New Zealand. The author comes to the conclusion that,while it does not 
need to be expressly reffered to in statues or codes, privacy needs to be recognized as a 
fundamental right in New Zealand, and that its violation should constitute a tort. 
The issues addressed will then be evaluated again in the light of the privacy rights of 
children, the different standards of protection required with regard to the privacy rights of 
children are highlighted., and a higher standard of protection is favoured . 
Word length: 16156. 
Count includes essay text only. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
"Privacy is the quietest of our freedoms. We need to listen for it with 
care"'. Unlike all other freedoms privacy is not expressed through any specific 
action and remains silent even when it is violated. Therefore it is hard to 
determine when it is infringed upon and where its scope of protection ends. 
First of all the range of privacy protection depends on the legal system in 
which the infringement takes place. Almost every country provides within its 
legal system an at least slightly different protection of privacy rights based on 
their notion of the importance of privacy. This varies greatly although one would 
not suppose that the importance attached to fundamental rights like the right to 
privacy could be as different as it is in countries like Germany and New Zealand, 
which both claim to base their society on the values of democracy. 
Furthermore, another important factor for solving the problem of the 
scope of privacy protection is that all specific circumstances of the respective 
case have to be included in the consideration. 2 Therefore it could be possible to 
say that at least everything that happens behind closed doors is encompassed by a 
privacy sphere in every country. 
But is it also possible to say that everything that happens outside these 
doors cannot be private regardless of where we are and what we do? Do we waive 
our right to privacy and consent to any violation of our right as soon as we leave 
our home? Or is the crucial factor in this case that we do not have a right to 
privacy which could be violated and therefore consent is not necessary? 
This paper will determine these questions in regard to the approach in 
Germany, the European Union and New Zealand and will therefore have a closer 
look at two landmark cases, Caroline von Hannover v Germany3 and Hosking v 
Runting~. According to these cases, dealing with the above mentioned issues, it is 
1 Paul Chadwick "The Value of Privacy" (2006) 5 EHRLR, 497. 
2 N.A. Moreham "Privacy in Public Places" (2006) 65 CamLJ 606 . 
3 [2004] ECHR 555 . 
4 [2005] 1 NZLR I (CA). 
5 
moreover crucial to consider who claims for the right to privacy in a public place. 
In a nutshell both cases state that public persons cannot have and because of their 
publicity in fact do not have the same expectation of privacy protection like 
"normal" people. Furthermore it also has to be taken into account what they are 
doing in public. The questions of whether this approach of the courts is correct, or 
revision is needed, wi II be the core of this paper. 
Additionally, one of the most essential problems dealing with these 
issues is not the privacy rights of the public people but rather the infringement of 
the privacy rights of their children. The courts unfortunately did not attach great 
importance to this. Unlike their famous parents the children are usually not able 
to prevent themselves from being put in the limelight. Therefore the decision 
about their privacy usually remains in their parents hands. Thus the crucial 
question, which needs to be answered is whether the fact that public people have 
a lower expectation of privacy in public, regardless of the courts decisions are 
right or wrong, leads to the same loss of privacy rights for their children. 
II PUBLIC PEOPLE 
Talking about public people it is necessary to define who public people 
are. Usually the materials use either the expression "public figure" or "celebrity" . 
In contrast to these phrases public people shall encompass a broader scope of 
people in the limelight, because5 
[a] public figure has been defined as a person, by his accomplishments , fame, 
or mode for living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the 
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has 
become a ' public personage ' . 
5 William L. Prosser " Privacy" (1960) 48 Cal L Rev 383 , 41 O; Cason v Baskin (1947) 159 Fla 31 , 
36 . 
6 
He or she is therefore someone who has brought him or herself into the 
public eye by their own voluntary efforts6 • Public people, on the other hand, also 
include persons who are in the focus of public interest simply and solely because 
of their origin, for example Caroline of Hanover, who is a member of the royal 
family of Monaco and because of this a public person from birth. 
In addition to this scope of people and this way of becoming famous, 
there are also people who were caught by the limelight as a result of their 
behaviour but actually did not seek the public spotlight with their "activities". 
Criminals for example would in fact be happy to be kept out of the public 
interest, firstly, because being in the media always implies that they have not 
been successful with their crime and have been caught. 
Secondly, criminals, especially after they have served their sentence, 
understandably want the crime to be forgotten by the public and to aim for a 
"normal" life, which is impossible if they are exposed by the media. For instance, 
in Tucker v News Media Ownership7 the plaintiff had been convicted of criminal 
offences. The media tried to publicize this issue years later while he was trying to 
seek donations from the public for heart surgery, which he otherwise could not 
afford on his own. The question in these cases is whether a fact that used to be 
public can become private again and by it part of someone's privacy after a 
period of time. 
As including this circle of "public people" would be too wide-reaching, 
although interesting, this paper will focus for the sake of clarity and brevity on 
public people encompassing celebrities, royals and their children and excluding 
criminals, politicians and people who involuntarily gained the public eye. 
6 William L Prosser above n 5, 410 . 
7 [1986] 2 NZLR 716. 
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III DEFINITION OF PRIVACY 
The decision as to whether someone ' s right to privacy 1s infringed 
requires the definition of privacy in order to determine what is protected by this 
right and in turn whether the scope of application of the respective privacy right 
is affected. 
In regard to the multitude of attempts to define privacy it seems almost 
impossible to determine what privacy exactly means. Generally speaking 
everything that is not public is private and therefore part of a person ' s privacy. 
But as Gleeson CJ already summarized8 
[t]here is no bright line to be drawn between what is private and what is not. 
Use of the term "public" is often a convenient method of contrast, but there is 
a large area in between what is necessarily public and what is necessarily 
private. An activity is not private simply because it is not done in public. It 
does not suffice to make an act private that, because it occurs on private 
property, it as such measure of protection from the public gaze as the 
characteristics of the property, the nature of the activity, the locality and the 
disposition of the property owner combine to afford. 
So it remains obscure what is private and what is not. It seems to be like 
a fata morgana that never gets any closer no matter how hard you try to reach it. 
The definition of privacy does not become any easier by taking into account its 
definition in different legal systems. In fact the values of every society and 
culture contribute greatly to what is seen as private9 • 
Nevertheless, every society at least has an idea of privacy, though this 
can vary. The basic principle, above all in western societies, appears to be a three-
piece form of privacy, which includes the intimacy sphere that is usually 
8 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v lenah Game Meats [2001] HCA 63 , para 42 Gleeson J. 
9 Huff(l980) 55 Wash LR 777, 783 . 
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connected to a closed space, for example the home area 10 • Then there is a 
restricted public space, for example the office, and the third stage is an open 
public space 11 • Thus the most practical possibility to define privacy is by the place 
where someone can be found. Above all because "[p]rivacy is about the 
individual having control of certain information about himself or herself' 12 and is 
easier to keep information confidential in a closed space than in public. However, 
obscurity still remains about the restricted and the open public space. Because it 
always depends on the special circumstances of each case it cannot generally be 
said that in these spaces privacy is totally impossible merely because it is more 
difficult to keep things private. Depending on the activity and the specific 
conditions of the case, the behaviour in public can also be encompassed by 
someone's privacy. 
However, more generally spoken privacy is also stated as "the right to 
be let alone" 13 • In regard to the fruitless attempts to define privacy more precisely, 
the latter description seems to be the most workable characterization of the 
concept of privacy. 
Nevertheless, as already mentioned in the introduction 14 for a public 
person the scope of privacy is not as wide reaching as it is for a "normal" person, 
especially in a public place. 
Therefore he or she cannot usually claim to be injured in his or her 
privacy rights if he or she was in public and there has not been any indication that 
the behaviour is intended to be private. However this is a problem of the privacy 
rights and not of the person's privacy, and as such will be discussed in the chapter 
dealing with the privacy rights. Hence privacy cannot be defined apart from this 
very broad description. The problems with this definition and the scope of the 
right to privacy must therefore be solved by the courts on a case-by-case basis. 
10 Hugh Tomlinson Privacy and the Media (London, Matrix Chambers, 2002) 22. 
11 Ibid. 
12 John Burrows "Invasion ofprivacy" (2006) NZLR 389, 391 . 
13 Warren and Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 HarvLR 193. 
14 See Introduction page 2. 
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IV RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Following this mostly unsatisfying definition of privacy, it is inevitable 
to have a look at the statutes and cases dealing with privacy in order to determine 
to which degree the New Zealand, German and the European legal systems 
protect the possible wide range of privacy and where they differ. 
A Germany 
In Germany a lot of statutes deal with the protection of privacy, for 
example the KUG, the German Civil Code and the Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany (BL). For the sake of clarity therefore this chapter starts 
with an overview of the statutes. 
1 German Basic Law (BL) 
In the German legal system the right to privacy is codified in the Basic 
Law. It is part of the right to the protection of personality rights which is 
guaranteed under section 2( 1) of the BL by stating " [ e ]very person shall have the 
right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the 
rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral Jaw" 15 • This 
section has to be read in conjunction with section 1(1) BL, which says that 
" [h]uman dignity shall be inviolable" and that" [t]o respect and protect it shall be 
the duty of all state authority. " 16 
Furthermore, two landmark cases dealing with the right to privacy are 
the "Caroline-cases" 17• In short, these cases deal with the possible infringement of 
her right to privacy, because magazines published photographs showing Caroline 
of Hanover in scenes from her private life taking place in public but without 
consent. Within these cases it was very important to keep in mind that the 
15 See Appendix I article 2(1) BL. 
16 See Appendix I article 1(1) BL. 
17 See Hamburg Regional Court (4 February 1993) 324 0 537/93 and Hamburg Court of Appeal 
(8 December 1994) 3 U 64/94, BGH (1995) 131 BGHZ 339, BVerfG (2000) 14 NJW 1021. 
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children of the clamaint, depicted on some of the pictures, are also affected. Thus 
the right of family protection of Caroline has to be taken into account as well. 
This right is enshrined under section 6 of the BL by guaranteeing that "[m]arriage 
and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state" 18 and furthermore 
" [t]he care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents and a duty 
primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch over them in the 
performance of this duty." 19 
The high valuation of these rights and their importance was also 
recognized by the Justices of the Federal Constitutional Court in the "Caroline-
case" by concluding that2° 
featuring the applicant with her children had infringed her right to the 
protection of her personality rights guaranteed by sections 2 (I) and I (I) of 
the Basic Law, reinforced by her right to family protection under section 6 of 
the Basic Law. 
When discussing the right to privacy, it needs to be recognized that there 
1s a further important Basic Right conflicting with the rights of Caroline von 
Hannover2 1• This is the freedom of expression and the freedom of press, which is 
guaranteed by section 5 (1) of the BL: 
Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his 
opinions in speech, writing, and pictures and to inform himself without 
hindrance from generally accessible sources . Freedom of the press and 
freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed . 
There shall be no censorship. 
Whenever two rights are in competition the court needs to evaluate 
which right has the higher status in the special circumstances. In regard to the 
18 See Appendix I Article 6 (I) BL. 
19 See Appendix I Article 6 (2) BL. 
20 Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 555 , Is 25. 
2 1 Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 555 , Is 24. 
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right to privacy the competing right usually is the freedom of expression of the 
media, which wants to publish information about the claimant. The approach in 
these cases to balance the opposed basic rights will be discussed in more detail in 
the chapter dealing with these particular cases. 
2 German Civil Code 
The Civil Code (CC) does not protect the right to privacy as extensively 
as one might assume in regard to the high valuation of privacy by the BL. In fact 
the CC protects the right to privacy very insufficiently. 
Firstly, just one aspect of the right to privacy is protected expressly by 
providing the right to a name under section 12 CC which states that22 
[i]f the right of a person to use a name is disputed by another person, or if the 
interest of the person entitled to the name is injured by the unauthorized use of 
the same name by another person, the person entitled may require the other to 
remove the infringement. If further infringements are to be feared , the person 
entitled may seek a prohibitory injunction . 
Furthermore the right to privacy falls within the broad definition of 
"another right" under section 823 (I) of the CC, which states that " [ a J person 
who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, 
freedom, property or another right of another person is liable to make 
compensation to the other party for the damage arising from this" 23 • 
Since the latter provision covers, at least in regard to its wording, all 
possible infringements of privacy in contrast to section 12 CC which solely 
protects the right to a name, one could assume that this regulation offers adequate 
defense against a violation of privacy. But after a closer look on this rule the flaw 
of this regulation becomes evident, because it only applies where the plaintiff can 
22 Section 12 German Civil Code. 
23 Section 823 ( 1) Civil Code. 
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prove that he or she has suffered damage from the infringement of his or her 
privacy rights. 
3 German Copyright (Arts Domain) Act 
At least in regard to the right to one's own likeness another essential 
statute is the Kunsturhebergesetz (KUG), the German Copyright (Arts Domain) 
Act which provides further protection. This Act states under its section 22 that 
" [p]ictures can only be disseminated or exposed to the public eye with the express 
approval of the person represented" . Exemptions to this rule are regulated under 
section 23. The crucial provision in the Caroline-case is section 23 (1) KUG. 
According to this the publication of pictures portraying an aspect of 
contemporary society are exempted from the obligation to obtain the consent of 
the person concerned within the meaning of section 22 KUG. 24 
Thus the plaintiff does not have to prove any damage, but the defendant 
has to show that they obtained the consent of the depicted person. 
But since all of the above mentioned statutes are basically grounded on 
the values of the BL this paper will focus on the constitutional protection of 
privacy. As mentioned above the right to privacy is protected under art 2 (1) in 
conjunction with art 1 (1) BL. "The connection with Art. 1(1) BL enhances the 
constitutional protection awarded to personality rights, as the respect for human 
dignity is the most important constitutional principle"25 • This is based on the fact 
that "some aspects of the development of one's personality are so closely linked 
that they deserve a greater degree of protection than other human behaviour"26 • 
By dealing with constitutional rights, it is important to keep in mind that 
the Basic Rights do not apply directly between private parties as by their nature 
24 German Copyright (Arts Domain) Act, ss 22, 23. See Appendix I; See also: van Hannover v 
Germany, ibid. II 1 a) cc). 
25 Sabine Michalowski and Lorna Woods German Constitutional Law - The protection of civil 
liberties (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, Brookfield 
USA, Singapore, Sydney, 1999), 115. 
26 Ibid . 
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they are primarily intended to protect the individual from acts or omissions of the 
state, but not of other individuals. Therefore no one can go to court and claim to 
be infringed by another private person in their Basic Rights These Rights only 
"bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law"27 • 
However, they can indirectly apply to the interpretation of the Civil Code and 
other statutes through their "general clauses", for example sections 22, 23 of the 
KUG 28 and section 823(1) CC. Thus these general clauses are the "points of 
entry" into private law for the Basic Rights29 and therefore the only way to apply 
statutes of the civil law correctly is for the judges to interpret the respective 
applicable statute on the basis of the values incorporated in the BL. This process 
is called the indirect effect of constitutional values ("Drittwirkung"). Reference 
this indirect effect is not necessary if an individual makes not a private but a 
constitutional claim to the constitutional court. In this case the justices can apply 
the Basic Rights directly and balance competing rights like the freedom of 
expression30 and the right to privacy3 1, as here the defendant is not a private 
person but the state or one of its organs. 
These remarks might give the impression that the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (BORA) and the BL are quite similar, because both only apply 
to legislature, executive and judiciary32 • But, unlike the BL the BORA has no 
constitutional position and therefore does not affect any other enactments solely 
because they are inconsistent with the provisions of the BORA33 • However the 
important factor is that both legal systems are familiar with the balancing of 
competing interests when it comes to the balancing of the right to privacy against 
27 See Appendix I article I (3) Basic Law. 
28 See Appendix 1, ss 22, 23 KUG. 
29 BYerfGE 7, 198 liilh. 
30 See Appendix I art 5 (I) Basic Law. 
3 1 See Appendix I art 2 (1) in conjunction with art I(!) Basic Law. 
32 See Appendix 1 art I (3) Basic Law, s 3 NZBORA. 
33 Sees 4 NZBORA. 
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the freedom of expression34 , although they come to different conclusions by 
solving almost identical cases35 • 
Unlike the Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting36 the Constitutional 
Court decided in favour of Caroline's and her children's right to privacy and 
concluded that it outweighs the freedom of expression in this case, because it is 
reinforced by their right of family protection37 under article 6 BL38 • 
4 Introduction to the German BL 
After this first overview of the German legal system, further comments 
on the German BL are necessary in order to understand the arguments of the 
German Courts. Generally speaking the BL, which is the constitution of 
Germany, is binding for all three powers39 and thus even the legislature does not 
have the power to disregard its provisions. Therefore the Basic Rights are 
guidelines with which all public authorities have to comply with. 
As already mentioned above the BL does not apply directly between 
private parties; consequently a private person cannot claim that he or she has been 
violated in his or her Basic Right. The only possibility to maintain an 
infringement of a Basic Right is by making an individual constitutional complaint 
before the Federal Constitutional Court40 • However, such a complaint requires 
among other things that the plaintiff has already exhausted all judicial remedies 
on a regional and federal level, which have taken the right to privacy and the 
freedom of expression into account by interpreting the respective relevant 
provisions in order to make a decision. This requirement presents an obstacle for 
the access to the Federal Constitutional Court that is hard to overcome in practice. 
34 Hosking v Runting above n 4, BVerfG (2000) 14 JW I 021. 
35 Ibid . 
36 Above n 4. 
37 BVerfG above n 34, I 026. 
38 See Appendix I, art 6 BL. 
39 SeeAppendix l , art.1(3)BL. 
40 Michalowski above n 25 , 44. 
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5 Passage of the case through the courts 
Therefore Caroline prior to making her individual constitutional 
complaint had to go to the courts on the lower level first. 
(a) Hamburg Regional Court and Court of Appeal 41 
The Justices of the Hamburg Regional Court decided that Caroline has 
not been violated in her right to privacy and justified their decision by arguing 
that she is a figure of contemporary society ''par excellence" according to section 
23 (1) no I KUG and therefore she had to tolerate the publication of the pictures. 
The Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion, so that she applied to 
the Federal Court of Justice for a review of her case. 
(b) Federal Court of Justice 
The Justices at this court came basically to the same solution except for 
one point; concerning the pictures of Caroline and Vincent Lindon they made a 
differing judgment and concluded that figures of contemporary society42 
could not rely on the protection of their privacy unless they had retired to a 
secluded place - away from the public eye - where it was objectively clear to 
everyone that they wanted to be alone and where, confident of being away 
from prying eyes, they behaved in a given situation in a manner in which they 
would not behave in a public place. 
ln regard to the pictures showing her with Vincent Lindon these 
requirements are met, because according to the judgment of the justices Caroline 
and Vincent were in a public restaurant, but they obviously wanted to be left 
alone by sitting in a hidden place in the rear of the restaurant. 
41 See Hamburg Regional Court (4 February 1993) 324 0 537/93 and Hamburg Court of Appeal 
(8 December 1994) 3 U 64/94. 
42 BGH(l995) 131 BGHZ339. 
16 
(c) Federal Constitutional Court 
After this mostly unsatisfying passage through the courts Caroline 
submitted her case to the Federal Constitutional Court, which made a differing 
judgment concerning the pictures of Caroline's children. The Justices stated that 
the freedom of press does not solely cover the area of politics but also ranges over 
mere entertainment as well.43 
The reasoning for their solution was mainly based on the fact that they 
found that the decisions of the Federal Court of Justice had disregarded the fact 
that the right to privacy of the appellant is reinforced by section 6 of the Basic 
Law regarding that person's intimate relationship with their children. After 
balancing Caroline's " reinforced right to privacy" against the freedom of 
expression of the publisher of the magazines the justices concluded that the 
parent-chi Id relationship supersedes the latter and therefore the photographs 
cannot be published without the consent of the parents44 • 
But in order to get to this conclusion they had to go through several steps 
to determine the infringement of the right to privacy and a possible justification. 
The first step involves the determination whether the claimed action has affected 
the scope of the privacy right in the first place. "This not only guarantees that the 
individual does not have to disclose embarrassing or detrimental information, but 
further respects the interest of the individual to keep all personal information to 
him- or herself' '45 • Within this scope of protection falls , furthermore, the right to 
decide how to represent oneself in public, including which personal information 
will be made public and the right to one ' s own picture and word .46 
Consequently, the scope of protection of the right to privacy is obviously 
concerned by the pictures of Caroline. A violation of a Basic Right is defined as 
" [e]very state action that prevents the citizen from exercising his or her basic 
right"47 • In the present case Caroline could not decide about the publication of 
43 BYerfG (2000) 14 NJW 1021 , 1024. 
44 Ibid, I 026. 
45 Michalowski above n 25 , 118. 
46 Ibid, 123. 
47 Ibid , 79. 
17 
pictures of her nor about her right to her own picture and the way she wants to be 
represented in public, because the courts dismissed her claims. Therefore the state 
action in this case lies in the decision of the courts that prevent her from 
exercising her Basic Right to privacy, thus not taking into account properly when 
interpreting the respective federal laws. 
After affirming that there is a given violation the next question is how 
possible conflicts with other constitutional interests are to be resolved , since the 
clash of the right to privacy and the freedom of expression has already been 
outlined. In order to solve this problem it is necessary to keep in mind that the 
Constitutional Court distinguishes two different spheres within the scope of 
privacy rights between which are evaluated on this level. 
The first, and also "more important", sphere is the intimate sphere, 
which is inviolable because of its high connection to the human dignity. But the 
Constitutional Court acknowledged also a second sphere, the personal sphere. 
This sphere encompasses an area for the individual within they communicate with 
others and the right to privacy must therefore be balanced against competing 
interests. 
Since Caroline was in a public place as the pictures were taken she could 
not claim to be violated in her intimate sphere and consequently the infringement 
could not be justified. Nevertheless as mentioned above the justification of a 
violation of the second personal sphere was still possible and given , thus calling 
for specific requirements to be met. 
Firstly the intrusion into the privacy right has to be within the limits of 
the Basic Right. For the sake of clarity and brevity it suffices to say that some 
Basic Rights have a statutory reservation and some do not have such a 
reservation48 • But in the present case this was not crucial , since in both cases the 
right can be limited by conflicting Basic Rights of third parties or by other legal 
values having constitutional status; and here the competing right to freedom of 
express ion was the decisive factor. Thus the right to privacy is limited by the 
freedom of expression which might therefore justify the infringement of the right 
48 Ibid. 
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to privacy. But this obviously cannot be enough to deny a claim for the violation 
of the right to privacy, because otherwise the freedom of expression ( or any other 
Basic Right) could always trump the right to privacy, solely because of its 
existence. For this reason the limits on a Basic Right also have limits49 • This 
means that the limitation of one right, which is in fact the infringement of another 
right, needs some kind of limit itself. The most important procedure to determine 
whether a limitation of a right is within its own limits is the proportionality 
principle. 
According to this principle the intrusion of the Basic Right is justified, if 
it is appropriate, necessary and reasonable to achieve the objective. Consequently, 
the infringement of the right to privacy can only be justified in the present case, if 
the limitation of the privacy right by the competing freedom of expression meets 
the requirements of proportionality50 (limit to the limit). In order to determine this 
it needs to be clarified what is meant by these prerequisites. Indeed it has to be 
kept in mind that the order of these cannot be switched and each of these have to 
be met for a justification of an injury. This means that if for example the 
infringement is not appropriate the fact that it would be necessary is no longer of 
importance and the intrusion cannot be justified. 
First of all , as already mentioned, the intrusion has to be appropriate. An 
intrusion is appropriate if it promotes the objective in any way51 • However this 
does not imply that it has to be the means of doing so. Therefore the first step of 
the scrutiny of proportionality can be affirmed very easily. In the present case, the 
freedom of expression of the magazines as the objective of the intrusion can only 
be provided, if Caroline ' s right to privacy steps back. Thus the infringement is 
appropriate, since it supports the objective. 
Secondly it has to be necessary. This is given if there is no way of 
achieving this objective that would be less intrusive to the rights of the citizen52 • 
In order to meet this requirement the least invasive kind of infringement must be 
49 Ibid, 81. 
50 Ibid, 83. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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chosen. But it has to be said that the infringer has to choose within those possible 
infringements that are likely to achieve the objective on the same level. There is 
no other way in the present case to promote the objective to grant the freedom of 
expression in the same extent other than to publish the pictures of Caroline and 
by that to infringe her privacy rights. 
Last but not least, the intrusion has to be reasonable as well. This means 
that it must be proportionate with the objective sought to be achieved which 
depends on an evaluation of the proper balance between means and ends53 • The 
determination of reasonableness is the core part of the proportionality principle 
and requires that the all specific circumstances of the case have to be included in 
a balancing test. 
First of all it is crucial that the infringement is within the personal and 
not the intimate and therefore inviolable sphere. Furthermore it has to be kept in 
mind that the pictures were taken in a public place and neither in an obviously 
private sphere like the home nor in a secluded area. Moreover Caroline is not 
doing anything which is apparently meant to be a private intimate activity, like 
for example kissing or hugging someone or anything of that nature. 
Nevertheless on the other hand there is no evident justification why the 
magazines should have the right to exercise the freedom to expression by 
publishing these pictures if there is no specific higher form of interest given. 
Since the publication would be an infringement of the right to privacy, it cannot 
be sufficient to justify this intrusion solely by stating that the infringement takes 
place in a public sphere which is less protected. Such an interest cannot be seen in 
this case. Caroline is pursuing her usual daily business and is therefore not in any 
official function. Thus the interest in these pictures can solely be based on pure 
curiosity of the readership. 
Additionally, as mentioned above and in fact the most important factor, 
her children are affected by some of these pictures. Consequently, their right to 
privacy, which will be discussed in further detail later on , is infringed as well as 
53 Ibid , 84. 
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the right family protection of Caroline under article 6 BL54. So the freedom of 
expression of the media has to be balanced not only against the right to privacy of 
Caroline, but also against the right to family protection, which reinforces her 
privacy rights. Therefore according to this balancing test the infringement is not 
reasonable and because of this not justified. 
B European Union 
This high level of protection of these rights is also provided within the 
European Union by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Convention) which regulates that "[ e Jveryone has the 
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence"55 • Furthermore, the ECHR noted that56 
private life, in the Court ' s view, includes a person's physical and 
psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the Convention 
is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, 
of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings. 
The freedom of expression is provided by stating that57 
[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression, this right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This 
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises. 
Thus both rights, the right to privacy and the freedom of expression, are 
protected and acknowledged to the same degree under the Convention and had to 
54 See Appendix I article 6( I) BL. 
55 See Appendix I article 8( I) Convention. 
56 (2005) 40 EHRR I para 50. 
57 See Appendix 1 article 10 (I) Convention. 
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be balanced in Caroline von Hannover v Germany58. The approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was furthermore similar to the 
proceeding at the Federal Constitutional Court, because there was no identity of 
the wording between the relevant provisions of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and the German Basic Law but rather an identity of the meaning. 59 
Both courts commenced by valuating the rights in an abstract way before 
including the actual circumstances into their consideration before finally 
balancing the competing rights60 • 
I Ruling of the ECHR 
After bringing her just partly successful complaints to the German 
Courts Caroline went to the European Court to seek for justice and therefore she6 1 
alleged that the German Court decisions in her case had infringed her right to 
respect for her private and family life as guaranteed by article 8 of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950. 
The judges decided "that the publication by various German magazines 
of photos of the applicant in her daily life either on her own or with other people 
falls within the scope of her private life"62 • Furthermore the decisive factor in 
balancing the protection of private life against freedom of expression lies in the 
contribution that the published pictures and articles make to a debate of general 
interest. 63 The judges did not find such an interest and decided that the applicant 
58 Ibid. 
59 Andreas Heidrich "Personlichkeitsschutz und Pressefreiheit nach der Europaischen 
Menschenrechtskonvention" (Protection of Personality and Freedom of Press according to the 
European Convention of Human Rights) (2004) 37 NJW 2634. 
60 Sophie-Charlotte Lenski "Der Personlichkeitsschutz Prominenter unter EMRK und 
Grundgesetz" (2005) I NVwZ, 50. 
6 1 Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 555 Facts Procedure 2. 
62 Ibid, para 53 . 
63 Ibid, para 76 . 
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was injured in her rights by the German Courts and therefore there had been a 
breach of article 8 of the Convention.64 
Consequently, as mentioned above, the wording of the German and 
European Statutes is slightly different, but the basic proceeding of the German 
Courts, especially the Federal Constitutional Court, and the European Court are 
almost identical. Both recognize privacy and freedom of expression as rights and 
therefore balance them in order to determine which right has to prevail in the 
respective case according to the specific circumstances. 
Thus, the ECHR underlined the importance of the press because they 
have the role of "watchdogs"65 for the public. But in regard to the immense 
significance of the right to privacy and the protection of personality rights, the 
weight of the freedom of press depends a lot on the contribution of the picture or 
the article to a debate of public interest66 • Therefore the ECHR concluded that in 
the Caroline-case this requirement was not met, because the pictures were just 
taken in order to satisfy the curiosity of their readership and deserved a restricted 
protection of the freedom of press67 • "The press must now demonstrate that 
publication of private information contributes to democratic debate fort it to be 
justifiable."68 Furthermore, just because a public person is part of the public eye 
or seeks the limelight, does not mean that they automatically lose their right to 
privacy whenever they are in a public place69 • It always depends on a 
determination of the specific circumstances of the individual case and whether the 
public person has mentioned the respective issue earlier on their own. 70 If they 
have not brought it into the public eye, then it is hard to argue that he or she has 
lost the reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore " [o]ne thing is clear from 
64 Ibid, para 80. 
65 ECHR (2000) NJW, 1015 (1016) . 
66 Ibid . 
67 Ibid . 
68 Angus McLean and Claire Mackey " Is there a Law of Pivacy in the United Kingdom? A 
Consideration of Recent Legal Developments" [2007] 9 EIPR 389,391 . 
69 Mark D. Cole '" They did it their way ' - Caroline in Karlsruhe und Straf3burg, Douglas und 
Campbell in London - Der Personlichkeitsschutz Prominenter in England" (2005) 6 ZRP 181 , 184. 
70 Ibid . 
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the Hannover case - the mere fact that someone is in some sense a public figure 
does not mean that she has no right of privacy when in a public place"7 1• 
Additionally, the ECHR criticised the approach of the Constitutional 
Court by using the figure of contemporary society in order to determine the scope 
of privacy protection and reasonable expectation of privacy. Such a distinction is 
solely sustainable if its requirements are clear. The principle of legal certainty 
involves that any person can distinguish anytime that he or she is in a situation 
where they have to expect the shooting and publication of pictures. 72 But this is 
not granted by using a concept whose requirements are blurry. 
2 Impact on the German Courts 
After the decision of the ECHR the German Courts, especially the 
Constitutional Court, from now on have to keep this solution in mind by 
balancing the Basic Rights and take these as an interpretation guide for their own 
decisions. This rule applies to all decisions although the decisions of the ECHR 
do not have a direct effect on the German legal system. Unlike the English legal 
system which incorporated the Convention into their law73 , the provisions of the 
European Convention of Human Rights are introduced into the German legal 
systems on a federal state level74 and not on the constitutional level and are 
therefore inferior to the BL in the hierarchy of the German statutes, which is 
above any federal (for example the civil code) or local regulation. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court has to take into account the ruling 
of the ECHR although it is not above the BL and the latter is generally the only 
guide the Justices have to comply with in finding their decisions. This is valid 
because, in simple terms, otherwise Germany would breach its duties as member 
of the European Union to comply with the decisions of the ECHR and their 
interpretation of the Convention. 
7 1 Alastair Wilson and Victoria Jones "Photographs, Privacy and Public Places" (2007) 9 EIPR 
357. 
72 ECHR (2004) 37 NJW 2647, 2650. 
73 Section 6 HRA 1998 (UK). 
74 See Appendix I article 25 BL, BVerfG (2004) 47 NJW 3407, 3408. 
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Nevertheless, in contrast to the first impression, the impact on the 
German Courts is not as far-reaching as one might assume. The decision does not 
introduce fundamental differences in regard to the present legal doctrine rather 
than to reposition existing aspects of valuation. 75 
C New Zealand 
1 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) 
The most important distinction between Germany and New Zealand is 
that the latter does not have a written constitution. Nevertheless, with the 
introduction of the BORA, although it does not claim a constitutional status, it is 
quite similar to a constitution in regard to its wording. But unlike a constitution 
the BORA is "only" an instrument for interpretation of other provisions without 
claiming consistency of these provisions. However, it might be at least a good 
first step in order to regulate the essential rights. 
For this the BORA guarantees under section 14 the right to freedom of 
expression 76 and enshrines by that in fact one of the most important rights of the 
New Zealand legal system. But interestingly there is no express right to privacy77 
in the BORA. 
Nevertheless this is no reason that there cannot be a right to privacy. 
One main argument for this is in section 28 BORA78 • Referring to this there is no 
general requirement that all rights have to be expressly included in the BORA in 
order to be applicable law. This is also supported by the fact that section 14 of the 
BORA encompasses the freedom to impart information of any kind in any form 79 • 
The freedom to impart information has to include the freedom not to impart 
information, especially if this information deals with personal issues. Otherwise 
75 Sophie-Charlotte Lenski "Der Persoenlichkeitsschutz Prominenter unter EMRK und 
Grundgesetz" (2005) I NVwZ 50, 51. 
76 See Appendix I s 14 Bill of Rights Act 1990 .. 
77 See Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR l (CA), paras 22, 77 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
78 See Appendix 1 s 28 BO . 
79 See Appendix l s 14 BORA. 
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this freedom would be worthless and the right would be a duty whenever 
someone does not want to impart information. 
Furthermore the right to privacy is80 
recognised less directly, but no less significantly, in provisions such as section 21 of 
the Bill of Rights, namely the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 
That right is not very far from an entitlement to be free from unreasonable intrusions 
into personal privacy. 
To put it in a nutshell , there is a right to privacy in New Zealand, though 
it is not spelt out in the BORA. The sole fact of the omission of a expressly 
codified right to privacy from the BORA was furthermore not accepted by the 
Justices in Hosking v Runting "as legislative rejection of an internationally 
recognized fundamental value."81 
But the important question remaining is whether the right to privacy has 
a higher value than the freedom of expression under section 14 of the BORA. 
This needs to be discussed later on within the individual cases . 
2 Protection of privacy rights by other statutes? 
Additionally, for the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that 
there are several New Zealand statutes dealing with privacy issues. Therefore 
simply speaking, it can be said that the New Zealand legal system at least 
recognizes privacy rights in the context of torts which are directly or indirectly 
related to the protection of privacy. 
The Privacy Act 1993 could offer a right to pnvacy or at least a 
definition what is meant by privacy. But the name is misleading, because this act 
does not encompass a right to privacy comparable to the German understanding 
of privacy rights. But this Act "applies mainly to the collection and disclosure of 
personal information and access to that information. There is no mechanism in 
80 Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I (CA), para 224 Tipping J. 
81 Ibid, para 92 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
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the Privacy Act for obtaining injunctions against publication of personal 
information ... ". 82 
Further protection is provided, for example, by the Defamation Law, the 
law regulating Trespass to Land and the breach of confidence. 
The claim of defamation requires following principles to be met83 
(1) a defamatory statement has been made; 
(2) the statement was about the plaintiff; 
(3) the statement has been published by the defendant 
However, apart from the difficulties of the tort of defamation in general, 
the important factor in the context of this paper is that this tort cannot provide any 
protection to privacy, if the fact that has been published is true. In regard to 
pictures therefore the depicted person would have to prove that the picture is for 
example manipulated. Otherwise the picture cannot be false and consequently 
also not defamatory. 
Furthermore the law of Trespass to Land is not very helpful either in the 
case where the pictures were taken in a public place and therefore the infringer 
does in fact not trespass the land of the infringed person. 
There might sufficient protection by applying the concept of breach of 
confidence. This is based on the principle that "no person is permitted to divulge 
to the world information which he has received in confidence"84 • The crucial 
elements for a breach of confidence are that85 
82 Atkin and McLaw and Hodge Torts in New Zealand: Cases and Materials (4 ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2006), 702. 
83 Stephen Todd (ed), The Lmv of Torts in New Zealand, (3 ed, Brooker' s, Wellington, 1997) I 6.2. 
84 Fraser v Evans [1969] I QB 349, 361 Lord Dennings. 
85 Coco v A.N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [ 1969] RPC 41 , 47 Megarry J. 
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[f]irst the information itself. .. must have the necessary quality of confidence 
about it. Secondly, that information must have been imparted in circumstances 
importing an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, there must be an unauthorized 
use of that information to the detriment of the party communicating it. 
In principle it can be said that the quality of confidence of the 
information is met if the information is not already in the public domain 86 or if it 
cannot be accessed easily by the public. Therefore the first question with the 
present issue is when pictures taken in a public place are not already in the public 
domain and consequently cannot be qualified as confidential although they might 
be private. But as noted in Cadbury Schweppes Inc v FBI Foods Ltd87 "[e]quity 
has set a relatively low threshold on what kind of information are capable of 
constituting the subject matter of a breach of confidence." 
Thus, there can be cases in which private information can be confidential 
at the same time. Therefore it remains to be seen whether the other requirements 
are met as well and consequently the breach of confidence provides sufficient 
protection for privacy infringements so that a separate tort of invasion of privacy 
would be unnecessary. 
The second prerequisite 1s that the information was disclosed in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. Usually this implies a 
contractual relationship, but a breach of confidence may happen also in other 
relations as well. Therefore the crucial question is whether this requirement can 
be fulfilled in cases like the Caroline-case. In these cases it is hard to construe a 
relation at all between the involved persons. And for the sake of brevity this paper 
will stick to the words of Justice Keith in Hosking v Runting stating: "I have 
difficulty with the application of the law of confidence of situations in which 
there is no relationship between the parties" and additionally, making the 
conclusion even clearer, to the argumentation of Justice Sedley noting:88 
86 Attorney General v Guardian Newspaper (No 2) [1990] 1 AC I 09. 
87 Cadbury Schweppes Inc v FBI Foods Ltd ( I 999) 167 DLR ( 4th) 577 609-6 I O Binnie J. 
88 Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd [200 I] 2 WLR 992, para 126 Sedley J. 
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What a concept of privacy does, however, is accord recognition to the fact that 
the law has to protect not only those people whose trust has been abused but 
those who simply find themselves subjected to an unwanted intrusion into 
their personal lives . The law no longer needs to construct an artificial 
relationship of confidentiality between intruder and victim: it can recognize 
privacy itself as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of 
personal autonomy. 
Consequently, these rules do not give people an instrument for 
protection against the publication of pictures of themselves. Therefore this paper 
will focus on the tort of privacy which was applied, although in the end denied, 
by the Justices in Hosking v Runting19 • Since this is the core case dealing with the 
right to privacy in New Zealand it will be considered in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
3 Approach of the Courts 
Similar to the findings above, a right to privacy was recognized in the 
case Hosking v Runting9°. In this case Mrs Hosking was shopping in Newmarket 
with her two daughters in a stroller while the photographs had been taken by Mr 
Runting9 1• He was commissioned by Pacific Magazines to take present-day 
pictures of the Hoskings92 • After Mr and Mrs Hosking gained knowledge about 
the existence of the pictures, they notified Pacific Magazines that they did not 
consent to the taking or to the publication of the pictures93 • 
89 Hosking v Runting above n 4. 
90 Ibid. 
9 1 Ibid. 
92 Ibid . 
93 Ibid. 
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(a) High Court Auckland 
The High Court dismissed the application of the Hoskings because no 
mJury was suffered94 • Mrs Hosking was photographed in a public place and 
therefore the pictures just showed a situation, which has been open to anyone95 • 
(b) Court of Appeal 
After their claim failed the Hoskings went on to the Court of Appeal 
with their primary claim96 
that the Court of Appeal should recognize their cause of action preventing the 
unreasonable publicity of private facts , calling for a development in the 
common law of New Zealand, reflecting equivalent common law 
developments in the UK. 
In regard to the question whether a tort of privacy exists the Bench 
decided three-to-two. However, the majority of the Justices dismissed the appeal, 
although they acknowledged the existence of a general tort of privacy, because 
they concluded that "there is not a general law of invasion of privacy"97 and the 
respective case is not encompassed by the scope of the right to privacy as far as it 
is provided in New Zealand.98 Moreover they decided that Mrs Hosking and her 
girls were not injured in their right to privacy, because they were not shown in 
any offensive way. An injury of the right to privacy is possible if the matter made 
public is "one that would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of 
ordinary sensibilities".99 This requirement was not met by the pictures subject to 
this case, since they showed an ordinary situation taking place in public. 
94 Ibid . 
95 Ibid, para 21 Gault and Blanchard JJ . 
96 Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I (CA). 
97 Ibid, para 7 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
98 Ibid, paras 7, 8 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
99 lbid, para 72 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
30 
Although the justices concluded that an infringement of the right to 
privacy has to be denied in this case, the important factor is that they granted a 
right to privacy in general as well as for public people. 
However the legal protection of the individual's privacy furthermore 
cannot be so far-reaching that it would be enough to confirm a tort of invasion 
simply based on the fact that someone wants the information about him or herself 
to be kept private 100 • Otherwise the freedom of expression 10 1 could be undermined 
very easily depending on the individual's will. Additionally it is necessary to 
keep in mind that Keith J and Anderson J disagreed with the majority and the 
recognition of a new tort of privacy. They based their decision on the fact that 
such a tort would be a limitation of the freedom of expression under section 14 
BORA that could not meet the balancing test according to section 5 BORA which 
requires that the limitation is "necessary" as well as "demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society". 
Such a limitation could not be justifiable since it is solely based on 
privacy values which can always be trumped by the freedom of expression unless 
"the contrary is indicated by the legislature" 102 • 
Furthermore, Anderson J stated that ' 'the development of modern 
communications media, including for example the worldwide web, has given 
historically unprecedented exposure of and accountability for injustices, 
undemocratic practices and the despoliation of human rights" 103 • However, in his 
view a new limitation on freedom of expression requires "greater justification 
than merely that a reasonable person would be wounded in their feelings by the 
publication of true information of a personal nature which does not have the 
quality of legally recognized confidentiality" 104 • He bases this argument on the 
fact that cases like the Hosking-case "are not about invasion but publication; and 
100 Burrows above n 12, 391. 
10 1 See Appendix I, s 14 NZBORA. 
102 Andrew Geddis " Hosking v Runting: A privacy tort for New Zealand" (2005) 13 Tort LRev 5, 
JO. 
103 Hosking v Runting above n 4 para 267 Anderson J. 
104 Hosking v Runting above n 4 para 267 Anderson J. 
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they are not about competing values, but whether an affirmed right 1s to be 
limited by a particular manifestation of a value" 105 • 
Is this the crucial point? Are we just talking about people who are too 
sensitive about the pictures which are published about them? Are we claiming for 
a right which is actually just a value? And even more importantly: do we have to 
wait for the legislature to start acting, or do we rather have to assume that " [i]f 
Parliament wishes a particular field to be covered entirely by an enactment, and 
to be otherwise a no-go area for the courts, it would need to make the restriction 
clear". 106 
Fortunately the majority granted the possibility of this new tort of 
invasion of privacy in a public place which requires several elements for the 
infringement of the right to privacy and moreover concluded by it that this 
intrusion is a justified limit according to section 5 BORA to the freedom of 
expression under section 14 BORA. This is above all also somewhat interesting 
because the Parliament had decided not to include a general right to privacy as 
part of the BORA when passing it by stating that101 
(t]he Bill (like the Canadian Charter) gives no general guarantee of privacy. 
There is not in New Zealand any general right to privacy, although specific 
rules of law and legislation protect some aspects of privacy. It would be 
inappropriate therefore to attempt to entrench a right that is not by any means 
fully recognised now, which is in the course of development, and whose 
boundaries would be uncertain and contentious. 
Therefore the crucial question remains why the Justices acknowledged a 
tort of privacy albeit the clear statement of this passage of the White Paper. 
Though at first glance this quote outlines that there shall be no general right to 
privacy, a closer look proves this assumption wrong. First of all and as already 
105 Hosking v Runting above n 4 para 266 Anderson J. 
106 Ibid, para 228 Keith J. 
107 Geoffrey Palmer A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper (Wellington, Government 
Printer, 1985) para 10 .144. 
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mentioned above, it does not expressly restrict the introduction of new torts of 
privacy to the legislature. 
Secondly, the statement is about 23 years old and what might have been 
correct at that time does not mean that it is still applicable nowadays especially in 
regard to the above mentioned decisions overseas. Interestingly the BORA at that 
time was meant to be enacted on a supreme status in the beginning108 • 
"Accordingly, any law made by these bodies which is inconsistent with the Bill 
will, to the extent of the inconsistency, be of no effect." Nevertheless in the end 
the status of the BORA is quite different from what it was supposed to be. This 
becomes evident by having a look at the wording of section 4 BORA that 
regulates that 109 
[n]o court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before 
or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights), -
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, 
or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment -
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill 
of Rights. 
Consequently it is obvious that one should not stick strictly to the earlier 
statements, since time has proven that Parliament does not do this either. 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that 110 
[t]he rights and freedoms included in the Bill are almost all firmly based on 
the existing law, common law or statute. The Bill reflects widely accepted 
public policy. And in several areas the Bill sets a minimum standard, leaving 
Parliament and the courts the opportunity as appropriate to give greater 
protection . 
108 Geoffrey Palmer A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper (Wellington, Government 
Printer, 1985) para 10 .17, Tim McBride and Rosemary Tobin " Privacy in New Zealand Case 
Law" (1994) 32 PLPR. 
109 Section 4 BORA. 
11 0 Geoffrey Palmer A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper (Wellington, Government 
Printer, 1985) para 3 .6. 
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Thus, the BORA is not meant to be an ultimate regulation but rather to 
provide a minimum level of fundamental rights. In addition, at that time the right 
to privacy was not fully recognised and developed, but this does not imply that it 
cannot be recognised by the courts now. Therefore the judgement of the court in 
Hosking v Runting might show that this right is finally fully recognised and the 
boundaries of it can be drawn without uncertainty and by that the courts can now 
give greater protection of privacy. 
Jn order to clarify the assumption of whether the time to introduce a 
workable tort of invasion of privacy has come, the requirements of this new tort 
need to be scrutinized. This tort firstly requires a public disclosure of facts in 
respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is needed 11 1• 
Furthermore the disclosure must be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities and there must be no legitimate public interest in 
the disclosure. Moreover this case expressly states that the freedom of expression 
has to be balanced against the right to privacy and by that the principle of 
proportionality has to be followed 11 2 • 
But what exactly do these requirements mean? In order to determine 
whether the decision of the Justices is correct and provides a further step in 
regard to sufficient protection of the privacy rights, a closer look on the cases and 
the above mentioned requirements is necessary. 
4 Requirements of privacy tort 
(a) Reasonable expectation of privacy 
First of all a specific type of information must be the subject of 
publication, which is claimed to violate the right to privacy. As stated above they 
have to be based on facts that someone can reasonably expect will not be 
111 Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 2. 
11 2 Hosking v Runling above n 4, para 235 Tipping J. 
34 
published. Unlike the regularly used expression "private facts" 113 , this formulation 
seems to have a wider scope of protection. Therefore not only intimate private 
personal facts are encompassed, but also all kind facts that someone can 
reasonably expect will not be published shall be covered. 11 4 It is also possible that 
even facts that used to be public can become private again after a while and the 
concerned person would consequently have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in regard to this fact. 
Unfortunately it is still not very clear what exactly shall be encompassed 
by this requirement to the last extent. Nevertheless it is an important step that the 
Justices did not narrow the scope of application down to " private" facts solely. 
But still they restricted the tort to "wrongful publicity given to private lives" 11 5 • 
Thus their Honours did not constitute a tort that covers an "unreasonable 
intrusion into a person's solitude or seclusion" 11 6 • 
Though it is hard to determine what can reasonably be expected and 
which facts cannot be expected to be kept private. In regard to public persons it is 
even more difficult to decide whether a reasonable expectation of privacy is still 
given, especially when they are in a public place and not in a secluded, obviously 
private place like their home. The Justices in Hosking v Runting solely stated by 
dealing with this issue that 11 7 
[t]he right to privacy is not automatically lost when a person is a public figure, 
but his or her reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to many areas of 
life will be correspondingly reduced as public status increases. Involuntary 
public figures may also experience a lessening of expectations, but not 
ordinarily to the extent of those who willingly put themselves in the spotlight. 
113 For example l v G [2002] OCR, Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [ I 986] 2 NZLR 716, 
Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [ 1993] I NZLR 415, P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591. 
11 4 John Burrows " Invasion of Privacy" (2006) NZLR 389, 391. 
11 5 Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 118 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
11 6 Ibid. 
117 Ibid, para l 21 Gault and Blanchard JJ . 
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But generally speaking it is accepted by the courts that public people 
lose at least to some extent their right to privacy by seeking publicity 118• The 
seeking of publicity should therefore constitute a consent to the waiver of their 
rights 11 9• Furthermore the "personalities of and affairs are already public facts and 
not private ones" . 120 
Nevertheless it remains unclear to which extent the reasonable 
expectation of privacy diminishes by seeking public adulation. At least it should 
be possible to argue that the sole fact of being part of the public limelight cannot 
lead to a complete loss of privacy expectation even in a public place. This has to 
be based on the fact that only 121 
[f]ew people would expect that a photograph is being taken of them as they 
walk down a street (even a public one); in that sense few people intend to give 
away their privacy right simply by entering a public place. 
Public people probably still have to expect to be photographed in a 
public place, nevertheless this cannot lead to a justification in any case, especially 
if there is no specific legitimate public interest in the story. But this problem will 
be discussed later on. 
(b) Public disclosure must be offensive and objectionable 
Furthermore, the disclosure of the facts must be a public one not a 
private to met the requirement of this tort. This is quite easily to prove if for 
example the respective pictures are published in a newspaper. Moreover the 
disclosure needs to be offensive and objectionable. The problem with this point is 
that it always depends on the individual person ' s feelings how he or she feels 
about the disclosure and whether it is offensive or objectionable or not. Therefore 
11 8 Hannover v Germany above n 2, Hosking v Runling above n 4, Prosser above n 5, 411 ; Cohen 
v Marx ( 1949) 94 Cal App 2d 704, 705 . 
11 9 Cohen v Marx (I 949) 94 Cal App 2d 704, 705, Prosser above n 5, 411 . 
120 Prosser above n 5, 411. 
121 Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2005) 348 . 
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it is crucial to determine who has the authority to decide whether this requirement 
is met or not. In the end the courts decide, but even the Justices are not supposed 
to decide based on their personal feelings rather than on objective criteria which 
are open to scrutiny. The courts consequently apply the test saying that the 
disclosure must be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities in order to grant the objectivity. Nevertheless, the uncertainty about 
the decision continues, since the question remains who this reasonable person is 
supposed to be. By applying the "reasonable person-test" it is important to keep 
in mind that it needs to be determined what this person "would feel if they were 
in the same position" 122 as the affected person. 
However it remains obscure whether this element of the tort should be 
applied at all, because it is not convincing to require that someone has to feel 
highly offended in order to be infringed in his or her privacy rights. The fact that 
some (private) facts are made public should be sufficient and the highly offensive 
factor should be included into the balancing test of the competing rights. Why is 
the mere fact of prohibiting any kind of expression sufficient for an invasion of 
the freedom of expression is regardless of its content, but the infringement of 
privacy requires the facts to be "private" and additionally the disclosure to be 
highly offensive? There is no good reason evident to justify this unfair and 
imbalanced approach. 
(c) Defence of legitimate public concern 
"This defence allows for an explicit balancing of the privacy interest of 
the individual with the public's right to receive information which 'is of 
legitimate concern to the public' 123 ." 124 This phrase does not say what is meant by 
a legitimate public concern. To meet the requirement of a legitimate public 
concern mere curiosity in the publication cannot be enough. Otherwise the right 
122 P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, para 39 Nicholson J. 
123 Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 133 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
124 Andrew Geddis "Hosking v Runting: A privacy tort for New Zealand" (2005) 13 Tort LRev 5, 
8. 
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to privacy of the respective (public) person could be undermined and infringed 
too easily. This factor was in the beginning introduced by Justice Nicholson 
thinking that it might entail anything from "idle curiosity and amusement" to 
"assessment of character, credibility and competence". 125 But, on the other hand 
does this specific type of concern basically involve that the publication of facts 
for pure entertainment are excluded? It is furthermore acknowledged that " [t]he 
media plays a crucial role in educating, informing and entertaining the 
community, and any restriction on it threatens this role." 126 
One could therefore stick to the standard argument which is that127 
the right to control dissemination of personal information may be trumped by 
the interest of the public in knowing public, even intimate, facts about 
politicians, public officials, or celebrities, because the public has a right to 
know the truth about such people. 
But is this "right to know the truth" a legitimate public concern which 
gives a sufficient justification in the infringement of a public person's privacy? 
And even more importantly, can this really cover any type of information? One 
main argument against this interpretation could be that the freedom of speech is 
not meant to cover128 
private gossip, since gossip is not worthy of protection under any clause 
guaranteeing to free speech . And even if freedom of speech does cover the 
disclosure of private or personal information, it does not protect it from legal 
action in every case; the two rights have to be balanced and weighed in the 
context of the particular facts. 
125 P v D , above n l l 3, 60 l Nicholson J. 
126 Melissa Waterfield "Now you see it , now you don ' t: the Case for a Tort of Infringement of 
Privacy in New Zealand" (2004) I O Cant L Rev 182, 187. 
127 Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds) New Dimensions in Privacy Law -
International and Comparative Aspects (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006) 11. 
128 Ibid. 
38 
This approach should also be applicable in cases involving public 
people, although the interest in the publication of their lives might be depending 
on the circumstances legitimate especially in regard to their possible position as a 
"role model", because "celebrities embody certain moral values and lifestyles. 
Many people base their choice of lifestyle on their example. They become points 
of crystallisation for adoption or rejection and act as examples or counter-
examples"1 29. But indeed "it usually won't be enough to argue that celebrities are 
" role models", and therefore deserve to have their private foibles exposed, unless 
they have done something truly serious or deceptive". 130 
5 Justified limitation of freedom of expression? 
It is rather unsurprising that the introduction of a tort of privacy invasion 
limits the freedom of expression insofar as the publication of private facts can be 
prohibited if it meets the requirements of this tort. Nevertheless the crucial issue 
remains whether this limitation is also justified, because some authors might 
argue that this new tort "will stop some from speaking who otherwise would 
have" 131. There is no evidence for this concern, therefore it cannot be the only 
reason to decline a possible justification of this tort. 
First of all it is acknowledged that the rights provided by the BORA "are 
not absolute"132 . Therefore also "the right of freedom of expression is not an 
unlimited and unqualified right and [ ... ] is subject to limitations of privacy as 
well as other limitations [ ... ]."133 Thus, the "chilling effect" on speech, regardless 
of the matter how intense it can be, needs to be weighed against the weight of a 
right to privacy. 
129 ECHR (2004) 6 UC 672, 675. 
130 Steven Price Media Minefield: A journalist 's guide to media regulation in New Zealand (New 
Zealand Journalists Training Organisation, Wellington, 2007)262. 
131 Andrew Geddis "Hosking v Runting: A privacy tort for New Zealand" (2005) 13 Tort LRev 5, 
I I. 
132 Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington , 2005), 115, Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 113 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
133 p v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, para 25 Nicholson J. 
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Even all Justices in the case Hosking v Runting agreed in this crucial 
point and were of the same view, regardless of their opinion as to whether a tort 
of privacy exists or not, that for this tort to be lawful it must be a reasonable 
limitation to the freedom of expression. However it needs to be outlined how the 
determination of a justified limitation of rights should be exercised. Such a 
limitation is justified if it meets the requirements of section 5 BORA. Although 
there are points of criticism against the Moonen approach 134 , this paper will apply 
this approach for the sake of brevity and simplicity without further analysis. This 
states that' 35 
In determining whether an abrogation or limitation of a right or freedom can 
be justified in terms of s 5, it is desirable first to identify the objective which 
the legislature was endeavouring to achieve by the provision in request. The 
importance and significance of that objective must then be assessed. The way 
in which the objective is statutorily achieved must be in reasonable proportion 
to the importance of the objective. A sledgehammer should not be used to 
crack a nut. The means used must also have a rational relationship with the 
objective, and in achieving the objective there must be as little interference as 
possible with the right or freedom affected. Furthermore, the limitation 
involved must be justifiable in the light of the objective. Of necessity value 
judgements will be involved ... Ultimately, whether the limitation in issue can 
or cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society is a 
matter of judgement which the court is obliged to make on behalf of the 
society which it serves and after considering all the issues which may have a 
bearing on the individual case, whether they be social, legal, moral , economic, 
administrative, ethical or otherwise. 
It becomes evident by reading this approach that it is almost identical to 
the German and European approach including that a balancing test requires the 
consideration of means and ends by taking all aspects of the case into account. In 
order to make such a balancing act possible, it is essential to start with the 
134 Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2005), 140. 
135 Moonen v Film & literature Board of Review ("Moonen" Nol)") [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 
(CA), para 18. 
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importance of the freedom of expression, which is the cause of the infringement 
of privacy. 
The BORA says under section 14 that the freedom of expression 
includes "the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of 
any kind in any form." However, the wording of this section does not provide 
further guidance in regard to determining the weight of this right. Some might say 
in order to clarify and emphasize the value of freedom of expression by stating 
like Justice Anderson that136 
[f]reedom of expression is the first and last trench in the protection of liberty. 
All of the rights affirmed by NZBORA are protected by that particular right. 
Just as truth is the first casualty of war, so suppression of truth is the first 
objective of the despot. 
But still , the central factor to determine the value of privacy as the 
counterpart to the freedom of expression, which is admittedly a very important 
right. The limit cannot be to ask whether the majority of people care about it or 
claim for it, because the value of a right becomes evident every time a single 
person needs protection 137 • This is the reason why rights are regulated , to protect 
those who cannot protect themselves and the majority of people or the media is 
not usually the helpless victim. Therefore it is essential to see that searching for 
the truth and publish ingit is not justified in regard to all information, because it 
can be outdone by the interest of one person to keep this particular information 
private. 
Furthermore, the question whether the established tort of privacy is a 
justified limitation of freedom of expression, also in cases including public 
people, can be answered very convincingly by sticking to the words of Tipping J, 
because he concluded that138 
136 Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 367 Anderson J 
137 See also Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2005), 135. 
138 Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 239 Tipping J. 
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[i]t is of the essence of the dignity and personal autonomy and wellbeing of all 
human beings that some aspects of their lives should be able to remain private 
if they so wish. Even people whose work, or the public nature of whose 
activities make them a form of public property, must be able to protect some 
aspects of their lives from public scrutiny. Quite apart from moral and ethical 
issues, one pragmatic reason is that unfair and unnecessary public disclosure 
of private facts can well affect the physical and mental health and well being 
of those concerned. Their effectiveness in the public roles they perform can be 
detrimentally affected to the disadvantage not only of themselves, but of 
society as a whole. 
Nevertheless the Justices decided in the end that the Hosking family was 
not affected in their right to privacy. Therefore one cannot help but wonder, did 
the Justices misjudge the importance of the right to privacy in regard to the 
special circumstances and therefore conclude wrongly that the freedom of 
expression of the publisher outweighs the right to privacy in this case? 
Sometimes a change in the perspective helps to find an answer to a 
crucial question. Since the ECHR and the Constitutional Court have similar 
approaches to this issue 139 and generally a wider scope of protection of privacy 
rights 140 it might be fruitful to determine whether the Justices of these Courts 
would have decided differently form the Justices in Hosking v Runting1 41 did. 
D Comparison of the Legal Systems or Hosking in Caroline's shoes .. 
As outlined in the previous chapter the approaches of the legal systems 
are quite different, especially New Zealand compared to the others. Jn order to 
compare the legal systems it is necessary to have similar circumstances. Since the 
facts of the cases are slightly different it should be the most effective way to 
compare the cases by using the approach and the requirements of the German 
Courts but the facts of the Hosking-case as mentioned above. 
139 See Chapters A and B dealing with the German and European approach. 
140 See Appendix 1 article 8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and article 1(1), 2(1) BL. 
141 Aboven4. 
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First of all, the Constitutional Court would have applied the same 
provisions to solve the claim of the Hoskings as they did in the Caroline-case. 
Thus the crucial question which needs to be solved remains whether the 
Constitutional Court (or in fact the ECHR in addition) would have acknowledged 
a violation of the right to privacy. As mentioned above the first important 
distinction between these legal systems is that in comparison to New Zealand, 
Germany and the European Union have a codified right to privacy which 
provides protection also in regard to the right to one ' s own picture. But for the 
sake of clarity this paper will focus solely on the differences and therefore will 
not repeat the single steps of the scrutiny of an infringement of a basic right. 
One could possibly argue in the line with the Court that Mrs Hosking 
and her children might be a figure of contemporary society like Caroline of 
Hanover, because she tried to drag herself into the limelight in order to advance 
her husband ' s career. But since the ECHR recently decided that the German 
Courts have to change their procedure in cases involving public people and to 
apply elements which are clearer than the concept of figures of contemporary 
society 142 , it cannot be applied in this comparison either. 
However, apart from the fact that Mrs Hosking might be a public person, 
the German and European approach still would have acknowledged a right to 
privacy even in a public place. Therefore the specific circumstances and 
especially the distinctions to the Caroline-case have to be considered. 
Caroline was not photographed during an official event neither was Mrs 
Hosking, thus the factor of newsworthiness cannot be affirmed. Furthermore it 
does not become evident why showing Mrs Hosking while she is shopping should 
be of more legitimate public interest than Caroline. Additionally it has to be kept 
in mind that Mrs Hosking was, like Caroline, also photographed with her 
children. These pictures do not contribute to a debate of general interest at all 
consequently Mrs Hosking was also infringed in her right to family protection 143 • 
142 Sophie-Charlotte Lenski " Der Personlichkeitsschutz Prominenter unter EMRK und 
Grundgesetz" (2005) 1 NYwZ, 50, 52. 
143 Article 8(1) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
article 6 (1) BL. 
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This reinforces the right to privacy' 44 and outweighs the freedom of expression 145 
of the publisher, since no circumstance is given that would allow a different 
conclusion by applying the factors which were of importance to the ECHR. 
Consequently, the Hoskings would have been successful by taking their 
claim to the Constitutional Court or the ECHR. But does that mean that New 
Zealand has to be wrong in the approach not to codify a right to privacy (yet)? 
Just because other jurisdictions decide what is right for them, does not have to 
include that everyone doing it differently has to be wrong. 
Thus still the question remains : 
E Do we need a right to privacy in New Zealand? 
Answering this question require scrutinizing the benefits and 
opportunities which might be provided by granting a new tort or right to privacy 
and whether these are more desirable than actually the protection of the freedom 
of expression to the last extent. Unlike the freedom of expression which 1s 
obviously a very important right the importance of privacy is not as evident. 
Nevertheless, privacy is at least definitely a justified limitation on the 
freedom of expression. But this does not have to imply that there is a need to 
codify it as well , although "New Zealand is unusual in not protecting a general 
right to privacy through BORA" 146 • Within the balancing test of justified 
limitations values can be taken into account, therefore since privacy is at least 
acknowledged as an important value in this matter, this could be sufficient 
protection of privacy issues. Regulating an actual right to privacy would 
emphasize it even more by attributing it the same weight like the freedom of 
expression. Therefore in order to follow this approach and introduce such a 
statute a very good argumentation and justification is required. 
144 Article 2 (I) in connection with article I (I) BL. 
145 Article JO(J)Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
article 5(1) BL. 
146 Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington , 2005), 345. 
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First of all the development of the media has to be regarded with 
concern, since already in 1980 the necessity for a right to privacy was being 
argued because 147 
[t]he press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety 
and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, 
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. 
To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast 
on the columns of the daily papers. Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus 
harvested, becomes the seed of more, and in direct proportion to its 
circulation, results in a lowering of social standards and of morality. Even 
gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent 
for evil. It both belittles and perverts. 
As already mentioned in the context of the German BL and the justified 
limitations on freedom of expression in New Zealand, privacy is very closely 
linked to human dignity. This is acknowledged to be one of the most, or actually 
maybe the most important right a person has regardless of the legal system 148 • 
Moreover, it is essential to be aware of the fact that the freedom of 
expression and privacy do not always exclude each other rather than give people 
a basis to exercise the other one. Therefore one can say that 149 
[o]n the one hand, privacy is not just the right ' to be let alone' - the classic 
Warren and Brandeis view 150 - but includes private interchanges and shard 
experiences within the non-public communities. On the other hand, expression 
is not simply about what goes on in public arenas; freedom of expression 
includes choices as to mode, timing, location, audience - whether public or 
147 Warren and Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 HarvLR 193, 195. 
148 See article 1(1) BL, which expressly codifies human dignity, Melissa Waterfield "Now you see 
it, now you don ' t: the Case for a Tort of Infringement of Privacy in New Zealand" (2004) 10 Cant 
L Rev 182, 187, 215, Stephen Todd The law of Torts in New Zealand ( 4ed, Thomas Brooks, 
Wellington, 2005) 744, Edward Bloustein "Privacy as an aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to 
Dean Prosser" (1964) 39 NYO LRev 962, Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, para 50 
Nicholls J. 
149 Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds) New Dimensions in Privacy law -
International and Comparative Aspects (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006) 4. 
150 Warren and Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 HarvLR 193. 
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private - and even the choice not to speak at all if expression is understood as 
a freedom connected to liberty and autonomy. 
Furthermore the continuing search for truth can be attributed to both, 
privacy and free expression 151• Therefore the argument, as mentioned above, that 
limiting the freedom of expression would be similar to suppress the truth cannot 
be affirmed to the last degree. Moreover privacy gives the individuals the space 
to develop new ideas and their personalities within the chosen seclusion 
unimpaired from the pressures of society. 152 Thus, following this the individual 
can participate in debates after building his or her opinion in their private sphere 
and in turn exercise their freedom of expression. 
Consequently, it is essential to ensure a right to privacy m order to 
simultaneously grant the basis for the freedom of expression. 
F Special Problem: Children's Privacy Rights 
In order to emphasize the urge of a right to privacy, it is necessary to 
have a look on a special problem by dealing with the privacy rights of public 
people. This is the infringement of the privacy rights of their children, because 
they are immediately affected by refusing a right to privacy to public people, 
since "[i]t is a matter of human nature that interest in the lives of public figures 
also extends to interest in the lives of their families." 153 
But for the sake of brevity this paper will focus on the children of public 
people solely, because unlike other family member they cannot help themselves 
or be completely separated from the infringement of their parent's privacy. 
In Germany the Basic Rights are applicable for every person regardless 
of age. Therefore children are encompassed by the protection provided by the BL. 
151 See Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary 
(LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) 307-8 . 
152 Ruth Gavison "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" (1979) 89 Yale LJ 421,448; Andrew T 
Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds) New Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and 
Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) 31. 
153 Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 124 Gault and Blanchard JJ . 
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The fact that their parents have to claim on behalf of them and until a certain age 
children are not even aware of their possible rights does not change the ability to 
have these rights. Otherwise also persons lacking mental capacity could not have 
privacy rights either, because they are not able to exercise them. Above all the BL 
and in fact all other statutes are codified especially for helpless people like 
children or persons lacking mental capacity, who cannot defend themselves. This 
basic principle of a constitutional state would be completely undermined if the 
rights were not applicable to these people. Therefore the applicability of Basic 
Rights for minors does normally not depend on an age limit rather than on the 
nature of the Basic Right154. This principle applies to all Basic Rights "which an 
individual can have by the mere fact of existing" 155 , for example, human dignity 
under article l BL, right to life and bodily integrity under article 2 BL. Jn contrast 
to this legal capacity is required "for rights than can only be exercised in the 
context of legal transactions" 156, like for example the freedom of profession under 
article 12 BL. 157 
As the Right to Privacy is not expressly regulated in New Zealand, there 
is also no regulation whether it is applicable to children or not. But according to 
the meaning of the Right to Privacy there is no reason evident as to why it should 
not be applicable to children. 
But the essential question which needs to be answered is whether the 
children lose their right to privacy to the same degree that their famous parents 
do. 
As already outlined above it is accepted by the courts that public people 
lose at least to some extent their right to privacy by seeking publicity1 58 and 
therefore the seeking of publicity constitutes the waiver of their privacy rights 159 • 
154 Michalowski above n 25 ,70. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Caroline van Hannover v Germany above n 3, Hosking v Runting above n 4, Prosser above n 5 
411; Cohen v Marx ( 1949) 94 Cal App 2d 704, 705 . 
159 Cohen v Marx ( 1949) 94 Cal App 2d 704, 705, Prosser above n 5, 411 . 
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However it remains obscure why persons who did not seek the adulation of the 
public should be treated in the same way. This circle does not solely comprise 
people like Caroline of Hanover as one might assume, since she did not choose to 
be in the public eye rather than being part of it because of her descent. 
In fact it involves especially the children of public parents regardless of 
why they are in the limelight, because the children never decided to seek 
publicity on their own. Therefore the usual above mentioned justification for the 
infringement of privacy rights does not fit. This "special position of children" was 
also recognised by the Justices in Hosking v Runting and it was mentioned that it 
"must not be lost sight of' 160, but they concluded in the end that an infringement 
of the privacy rights of the children was not given, therefore they did not need to 
justify an infringement if they already deny the existence of a violation of 
pnvacy. 
However a justification is not needed if the children's privacy rights are 
actually not infringed by pictures taken in public places. As already mentioned 
the German BL is very strict in regard to privacy rights especially in cases where 
children are involved and find that the children's and parents privacy rights 
outweigh the freedom of expression and therefore the violation of the privacy 
rights in these cases cannot be justified 161 • 
Therefore it is crucial to determine whether the position of the Justices in 
New Zealand towards the children's right to privacy is justifiable as they mainly 
base their decision on the voluntary seeking of publicity by the parents, which is 
exactly the main distinction between them and their children, who did not do so. 
It might be also decisive whether the parents tried to keep their children out of the 
public 162 or "used" them to stay in the public interest 163 • In Hosking v Runting the 
Hoskings discussed the fact that they have troubles in conceiving children in 
several magazine articles including the IVF treatment. But after the birth of the 
twin girls they declined further interviews as well as to take pictures of them. 
160 Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 123 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
16 1 BYerfG (2000) 14 NJW 1021. 
162 Murray v Big Pictures Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446, para 14 Sir Anthony Clark MR. 
163 Hosking v Runting above n 4, paras 9, 10 Gault J . 
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I Violation of right to privacy 
But firstly it needs to be determined whether the privacy rights of the 
children are infringed by publishing pictures of them. This requires the public 
disclosure of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. This expectation might be lost in cases where the parents have already 
consented to the publication of pictures of their children. If not, the expectation of 
privacy is reasonable also in public places, because the children are a part of the 
private life of the public people that have nothing to do with their publicity. 
Indeed this way of argumentation takes it for granted that the right to privacy of 
the parents is infringed and does not say anything about the children ' s privacy 
rights. But if the publication of the pictures of the children infringes the right to 
privacy of their parents then it consequently also includes the violation of the 
privacy rights of the child, which is in fact affected . However, an infringement 
also requires that the publication would be highl y offensive and objectionable to a 
person of ordinary sensibilities. Talking about a child it is hard to determine who 
this person could be. Depending on the age of the child there will be no 
awareness of any invasion into their "privacy which does not involve some direct 
physical intrusion" 164 . Therefore it has to be an objective view 165 of the matter 
taking into account whether the parents have tried "to keep their children out of 
the public gaze" 166 • 
If the parents have done so then there has been a reasonable expectation 
of privacy even in a public place especially when there was no possibility to 
notice that they are being photographed. Finally the existence of a legitimate 
public interest in the disclosure in cases involving children should be connected 
to high requirements. In fact children of public people who have been kept out of 
the lime! ight are not newsworthy at all 167 and therefore an infringement of their 
right to privacy can never be outweighed by the freedom of expression . 
164 Murray v Big Pictures Ltd above n 32, para 37 Sir Anthony Clark MR. 
165 Ibid . 
166 Ibid para 38 Sir Anthony Clark MR. 
167 Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: a commentary (LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2005) 349. 
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Furthermore it might be possible to argue in the same fashion as in 
Hosking, who claimed that the photographs would increase the danger of their 
children being abducted. Nevertheless, the Justices dismissed this argument since 
they did " not see any substantial likelihood of anyone with ill intent seeking to 
identify the children from magazine photographs" 168 and furthermore they could 
"not see the intended publication increasing any risk that might exist because of 
the public prominence of their father" 169 , because the photos 170 
do not disclose anything more than could have been observed by any member 
of the public in ewmarket on that particular day. They do not show where 
the children life, or disclose any information that might be useful to someone 
with ill intent. The existence of the twins, their age and the fact that their 
parents are separated are already matters of public record. 
Apart from the argument of whether the publication of the pictures might 
increase the likelihood of kidnapping it is not out of question that the privacy 
rights of the twins can still be violated. Even though they have a public father and 
their parents gave interviews about the medical treatment in advance that does not 
necessarily lead to a lower expectation of privacy for the children. Given the 
circumstances in the Hosking-case, it was not evident why the children are 
newsworthy and the public should have a legitimate interest in the pictures, 
besides mere curiosity. Furthermore one cannot argue that the twins in regard to 
their age could even expect to be photographed secretly. 11 1 
In addition, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting is 
incomprehensible in regard to article 17 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (TCCPR) and article 16 United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (UNCROC), since the justices mentioned these provisions in their 
conclusion but apparently without further consideration. Both rules are almost 
168 Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 163 Gault and Blanchard JJ . 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid, para l 64 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
171 See Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2005) 349. 
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identical apart from the point that the latter is applicable for children only by 
stating that 172 
I. [n]o child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with her 
or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks 
on his or her honour and reputation. 
2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks. 
Thus, the privacy rights of children are expressly codified and have by 
that a special position and deserve higher protection. Consequently the Justices 
did not serve justice in their conclusion by almost disregarding the special needs 
of children. Just mentioning the importance of something 173 , apparently does not 
necessarily mean that the following decision will live up to the expectations. 
2 How to avoid infringement? 
In regard to children, provided that they are not an essential part of the 
story and therefore not newsworthy, a general demand of masking 174 or pixelating 
their faces should be a workable as well as a sufficient protection of their privacy. 
In contrast to that, one could also assume that it would be workable to treat 
children differently depending on their age. A baby for example is not even aware 
of its privacy, and therefore the theory might arise that no protection is needed 
since the infringement cannot be "felt". But the problem with children is that the 
injury will become evident later on and not by the time the infringement takes 
place. This depends especially on the point in time when this child will recognize 
the infringement. Every child should generally have the possibility to seek 
publicity or not, regardless of who their parents are. But this is made impossible 
if it is already in the limelight. Because the effects on the development of a child 
are not foreseeable, even remedies are not enough for possible emotional 
172 Article 16 UNCROC. 
173 Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 123 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
174 Peter Highton "Protection of Children's Privacy" (2006) NZFamLJ 147, 149. 
51 
consequences of publications at any age 175 • Furthermore one could argue that a 
little child unaware of its rights needs even higher protection from intrusions, 
because he or she cannot react at all to protect themselves and thus the 
government has the obligation to grant this protection extensively. 
Therefore it might be a good idea to improve the protection of the 
children ' s privacy rights by applying the Privacy Principles (PP) by the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) also in other cases involving the media. 
PP 6 regulates that176 
[c]hildren ' s vulnerability must be a pnme concern to broadcasters, even when 
informed consent has been obtained. Where a broadcast breaches a child ' s privacy, 
broadcasters shall satisfy themselves that the broadcast is in the child ' s best interests, 
regardless whether consent has been obtained. 
Consequently the child ' s best interest has to be taken into account even 
if consent has been obtained. One might argue that it would be a too high an 
obligation for the newspaper, for example, if they would have to determine the 
child ' s best interest in every case. But since it is workable for broadcasters (at 
least in theory) it should be worth a try for other areas of media as well. It should 
be even easier for newspapers rather than for broadcaster, because they have to 
decide pictures they want to publish anyway before they print and distribute 
them. In contrast to this , broadcasters could for example have difficulties if they 
want to make a live-broadcast. 
Furthermore, in regard to the wording one could assume that the 
publication has actually to be good for the child . In fact the broadcasters apply 
this rule in the sense that the broadcast must not be negative for the child 177 . 
175 Peter Highton "Protection of Children ' s Privacy" (2006) NZFamLJ 147, 149; Katrine Evans 
"Was privacy the winner on the day?" (2004) NZLJ 3; generally considering damages as an 
adequate remedy: Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 158 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
176 BSA Privacy Principle 6. 
177 New Zealand Broadcasting Standards Authority Real Media, Real People: Privacy and 
Informed Consent in Broadcasting in New Zealand (Dunmore Press Limited , Wellington, 2004), 
39. 
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Additionally, this factor is criticized as too unpractical , because it 
remains unclear how the best interest should be demonstrated 178 • But still this 
cannot be a reason to lower the requirements of this threshold. Otherwise any 
burden of proof could be put aside just because it was not convenient for the 
obliged person. However, it would be too much to expect the publisher tocome up 
to this task all alone. Therefore to grant this interest the publisher or broadcaster 
should consult a child ' s advocate 179 or a social worker who is trained to cope with 
this delicate issue as a neutral third party' 80 • As the consequences of the broadcast 
or publication and their effects on the child are not foreseeable to the last extent 
the child ' s best interest should not be assumed to be given universall y and the 
threshold for a justification of an infringement should be very high . 
G Can we do it? - Yes, we can! 
So, the important question is, how should we do it or how can we 
improve the existent privacy tort? As already outlined above, there are several 
areas within the requirements of the tort needs improvement. First of all , the 
valuation of privacy should be revisited to such extent that it should be clearly 
codified as a right rather than just a value. In doing so the approach in cases like 
Hosking v Runting would be and actually should be completely reversed - but 
hopefully in a positive way. 
Similar to the German procedure - and as well like the approach of the 
ECHR- the starting point would be the right to privacy and not the freedom of 
expression of the infringer. Following from there it should be acknowledged that 
(almost) every behaviour in relation to the protected spheres of privacy, such as 
the right to one' s own picture for example, that is not covered by the consent of 
the (depicted) person, is a violation of privacy even in a public place and even if 
178 Ibid, 44. 
179 See BSA 1999-093. 
180 New Zealand Broadcasting Standards Authority Real Media, Real People: Privacy and 
Informed Consent in Broadcasting in New Zealand (Dunmore Press Limited, Wellington, 2004, 
84. 
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it is a public person. Thus the scope of reasonable expectation of privacy should 
be much wider than that which is granted by now by the New Zealand courts. 
Then the next step would involve that the requirement of the highly 
offensive disclosure should be deleted completely. Even Justice Tipping was not 
to sure about this element by suggesting that "the qualifier should be a substantial 
level of offence rather than a high level offence" 18 1 and in the end it is a too high 
burden of proof for the claimant and furthermore can be taken into consideration 
within the balancing test. If the information, which is disclosed, would be too 
trivial, then the media would still have the possibility to argue that their freedom 
of expression outweighs the just slightly touched right to privacy of the affected 
person. Consequently, the improvement of the tort of privacy invasion includes a 
shift of the focus of determination away from the question whether there is a right 
to privacy at all and how can it be infringed, to the crucial element which is the 
balancing of the clashing rights by including the specific circumstances of the 
respective case. Furthermore, 182 
[t]he tort's infancy can, in fact be viewed as an advantage. It offers the New 
Zealand courts an opportunity to shape the law in a principle fashion , 
informed by the jurisprudence of the more experienced BSA, and avoiding the 
pitfalls of the American tort. 
At the end of the day the aim is not "that one right should win and the 
other should lose" but "to recognise both tot the maximum in any given 
situation" . 183 
181 Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 256 Tipping J. 
182 Melissa Waterfield "Now you see it, now you don ' t: the Case for a Tort of Infringement of 
Privacy in New Zealand" (2004) I O Cant L Rev 182, 205 . 
183 Katrine Evans "Hosking v Runting balancing rights in a privacy tort" (2004) 28 PLPR, 
(htip://www.austlii .edu .au/au/ journals/PLPR/2004/28.html last accessed 5 August 2008) 
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V CONCLUSION 
Privacy is the quietest of our freedoms and one of the significant basics 
for a working society. As outlined in this paper it enables the people to be on their 
own or with a self-chosen circle of other persons in order to build an opinion or 
personality they want to express. Following this they can exercise their freedom 
of expression in the most fruitful way. It is therefore one of the most important 
and essential tasks of a legal system to ensure that these fundamental rights are 
sufficiently provided. In regard to the findings of this paper the New Zealand 
legal systems does not yet live up to their high responsibility. This becomes more 
obvious when examining the privacy of a child, because then this rights becomes 
even quieter. Therefore children's privacy requires the statutes and courts to pay 
more attention to this concern and to be more considerate and thoughtful to grant 
sufficient protection for children. Even though it might be the child of a public 
person, it is disappointing that it is not valued more highly and protected by law 
than the freedom of expression in New Zealand. To grant the essential freedoms 
and rights to those who cannot protect themselves is the most important role of a 
legal system. In regard to these findings the courts in New Zealand do not come 
up to this task of dealing with the special needs of children's privacy rights. 
Unlike the German Constitutional Court and the ECHR they do not see the 
sensitivity of this delicate issue. Therefore it might be advisable to take the 
German approach as an example to improve at least the privacy rights of children. 
The first important step has already been taken by affirming the 
existence of a tort of invasion of privacy in Hosking v Runting18 -1. However it 
seems that the details of this fundamental right are not yet figured out to the last 
extent by the courts and "[ u Jn fortunately the case leaves at least as many 
questions unanswered as it settles." 185 Therefore it is likely and desirable that the 
courts will elaborate the privacy tort further within the future cases by taking the 
184 Above n 4. 
185 Andrew Geddis "The Horizontal Effects of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in 
Hosking v Runting" (2004) NZLRev 681, 704. 
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experiences of overseas jurisdictions into account186 , which grant a higher scope 
of protection of privacy especially in regard to children. 
Unfortunately, when talking to the people in New Zealand it seems that 
the importance they attach to the right to privacy is very low or almost not 
existent1 87 • Hence, as shown above it is almost impossible to provide a strict line 
between what is encompassed by it and what is not. But the essential factor is that 
people should start thinking and consequently also caring about their own 
privacy. Hereby they would also improve their understanding of the importance 
of a right to privacy of other people including those in the limelight. Even though 
the expectation of privacy of public people especially in a public place is lower 
than of "normal" people, this cannot mean that everything they do can be 
published by the media. By seeking the public gaze they do not waive their right 
to privacy to the last extent. It always depends on the type of information they 
already have brought into the public eye on their own. Therefore one could argue 
that public people want the publicity and that any publicity is good publicity. So, 
why should we care at all, if celebrities claim about a violation of their privacy 
after seeking the limelight? First of all , because we can, and secondly, because 
celebrities do not sell their whole intimacy and privacy to the world by publishing 
a specific part of their life. 
Giving the consent once (or even several times) does not lead to a 
standing invitation to an infringement of their private sphere. It is similar -
although an odd comparison - to a prostitute that of course consents to have sex 
for money because it is her profession. But nevertheless nobody would expect her 
to have waived away her right to decline to have sex with someone, even if she 
had no " reason" for the refusal. It is " basically the same" with public people. 
Consenting to pictures or other publications about them does not include the 
waiver of privacy rights in general for the future although it is usually their 
profession (in regard to actors or singers for example) and they put themselves 
186 Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446, Caroline von Hannover v Germany 
[2004] ECHR 555 , BVerfG (2000) 14 NJW 1021. 
187 Author's personal experience by conversations with New Zealanders. 
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into the public gaze voluntarily. The publication of this specific part of one's life 
does not encompass infringements to all other areas of their life by the media 188 • 
So, why not try something new and begin to protect the rights of those 
who care about their privacy? There might be the fear that 189 
[o]nce ' privacy' is elevated to the status of a legal principle directly 
enforceable by the courts, it is hard to see why any invasion of privacy - in 
the sense of an intrusion upon an individual ' s 'right to be left alone' 190 -
should not be actionable, 
since the Justices Gault and Blanchard expressly left it open that it is 
possible to expand this tort in this way 19 1• But does this necessarily mean 
something bad? Every part of one's privacy deserves protection and should 
therefore be included into the tort of invasion of privacy. Whether it will 
outweigh the freedom of expression (or any other competing right) in the end, 
depends on the solution of the balancing test 192 • The time has come to increase the 
awareness of the significance of privacy in order to change its existence in the 
background of people's minds. 
It is certain that the press will suffer no harm and will not lack of stories, 
because unfortunately they are always a lot of people around - especially "future-
celebrities-to-be" - , who do not care at all , as long as they are part of the 
glamorous world of celebrities and paparazzi . And even though some authors 
might argue that developing a new tort of privacy by the courts might be like 
placing "the judicial cart before the legislative horse" 193 , the New Zealand legal 
188 Mark D Cole "'They did it their way' - Caroline in Karlsruhe und Stral3burg, Douglas und 
Campbell in London - Der Personlichkeitsschutz Prominenter in England" (2005) 6 ZRP 181 , 
184. 
189 Andrew Geddis " Hosking v Runting: A privacy tort for New Zealand" (2005) I 3 Tort LRev 5, 
12. 
190 Warren and Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 HarvLR, 193 . 
19 1 Hosking v Runting above n 4, para 118. 
192 Katharina von Bassewitz " Hard times for paparazzi: Two Landmark Decisions concerning 
Privacy Rights Stir up the German and English Media" (2004) 6 IIC 642, 653. 
193 Andrew Geddis "Hosking v Runting: A privacy tort for New Zealand" (2005) I 3 Tort LRev 5, 
13 . 
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system can be glad that some Justices have at least finally started seeing this 
"horse" at al I. 
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VI APPENDIX 1: RELEVANT STATUTES 
A SECTIONS 3, 4, 5, 14, 21, 28 OF THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF 
RIGHTS ACT 1990 
(3) Application 
This Bill of Right applies only to acts done -
(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the 
government of New Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function , 
power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or 
pursuant to law. 
(4) Other enactments not affected 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made 
before or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights), -
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or 
revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment -
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of 
this Bill of Rights. 
(5) Justified limitations 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
(14) Freedom of expression 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom 
to seek, receive, and impart information and options of any kind in any 
form. 
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(21) Unreasonable search and seizure 
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure, whether of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise. 
(28) Other rights and freedoms not affected 
An existing right or freedom shall not be held to be abrogated or 
restricted by reason only that the right or freedom is not included in this 
Bill of Rights or is included only in part. 
B ARTICLES 1, 2, 5, 6, 25 OF THE BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Article 1 [Human dignity]: 
(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall 
be the duty of all state authority. 
(2) [ ... ] 
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, 
and the judiciary as directly applicable law. 
Article 2 [Personal freedoms]: 
(1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his 
personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or 
offend against the constitutional order or the moral law. 
(2) [ ... ] 
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Article 5 [Freedom of expression] 
(1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate 
his opinions in speech, writing, and pictures and to inform himself 
without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of 
the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and 
films shall be guaranteed . There shall be no censorship. 
(2) [ ... ] 
Article 6 [Marriage and the family; children born outside of 
marriage] 
(1) Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the 
state. 
(2) The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents 
and a duty primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch 
over them in the performance of this duty. 
(3) [ ... J 
Article 25 [International law and federal law] 
The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal 
law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights 
and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory. 
C SECTIONS 22, 23 OF THE GERMAN COPYRIGHT (ARTS DOMAIN) 
ACT 
Section 22 
1 Pictures can only be disseminated or exposed to the public eye with 
the express approval of the person represented. [ ... J 
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Section 23 
(1) Without the by section 22 required approval can be disseminated 
or exposed: 
1. pictures relating to contemporary society 
2. [ ... ] 
D ARTICLES 8, 10 OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 1950 
Article 8 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Article 10 
l . Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This article shall no prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television of cinema 
enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in 
a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
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integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary. 
E PRIVACY PRINCIPLES BY THE BSA 
I. It is inconsistent with an individual ' s privacy to allow the 
public disclosure of private facts , where the disclosure is 
highly offensive to an objective reasonable person. 
2. - 4.) ( ... ) 
5. It is a defence to a privacy complaint that the individual whose 
privacy is allegedly by the disclosure complained about gave his 
or her informed consent to the disclosure. A guardian of a child 
can consent on behalf of that child . 
6. Children ' s vulnerability must be a prime concern to 
broadcasters, even when informed consent has been obtained. 
Where a broadcast breaches a child ' s privacy, broadcasters shall 
satisfy themselves that the broadcast is in the child ' s best 
interests, regardless whether consent has been obtained. 
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